| Justice in Ethiopia www.justiceinethiopia.net By Dereje, September 27, 2003 Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi recently sent the United Nations Security Council and the Secretary General a letter dated September 19, 2003, in which he asks for a new resolution mechanism for resolving the “unresolved” areas of the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. While on the face of it this letter seems to imply a different direction, and even a change of heart on behalf of the Prime Minister on an issue that has much existential bearing and emotional weight to the vast majority of Ethiopians, closer examination in fact reveals this letter to be nothing more than a plea to Issayas Afeworki and the UN Security Council for flexibility and help in the project of selling out Ethiopian land, people and interest out of which Meles has made a career. 1. Meles starts off, in the first paragraph, by saying that,
2. His protestations on "Badme" are just on the "village of Badme", and not on the vast agriculturally rich plains south of the Mereb (remember the term "Mereb-Millash" as we will come on it in a little bit) and in Western Shire which have always been administered through Tigray. Remember that in the letter, he says of the village of Badme,
3. Meles then says,
Next, after a few diplomatic niceties, we come to a six point proposal on "resolving" the impasse. I will spare you the rest of the details, and come straight to points number 1, 4 and 5, which are the heart of the matter. 4. Ever the peaceful one, Meles says in Point #1 of his letter,
5. He then starts off point #4 by saying,
6. The same first sentence of the fourth point of this document, continues in describing the other "uncontested" area, namely:
6b) It is also interesting that he falls back on the "Mereb" river as a natural boundary. Please see my statement above about the phrase "Mereb Millash", which Ethiopians and Eritreans know as the historic boundary between Eritrea and the rest of Ethiopia. When it is convenient for Melles he remembers this historical reality, and thus cannot fail to use it as a reasonable basis for arguments. Call this Evidence #7.
8. Point number 5 of Meles' letter then completes these instances of sins of omission, (i.e. Evidence #2, Evidence #5 and Evidence #6), and completes them by a sin of commission, when he says:
The southern boundary of the Temporary Security Zone is formed on the basis of what Meles understood to be the Colonial Treaty lines, and NOT on what has historically been administered by Ethiopia. For the Western Sector, about which Meles now says nothing, this issue is important, in that the TPLF had already, even before 1991, given up Ethiopia's right on much of the land west of this line anyway, and hence that is why after the war, the Ethiopian army was pulled back, NOT to the historically Ethiopian administered line, but to the line that the TPLF had ALREADY given to Eritrea. In other words, the dead treaties established the “straight line” east of which was supposed to be administered by Ethiopia and west of which was supposed to be administered by Italy. But Italy NEVER administered on IT'S side of the line. Ethiopia however, (through Tigray) administered ALL the land south of the Mereb/Gash, and hence the “straight line” never was a line of actual administration. That is why the general understanding of the Mereb as the northern boundary of Tigray persists. So Ethiopia's administrative history, and the experience of the people who live there, is that the “natural boundary” is and has always been the Mereb/Gash river. Then in 1935, Mussolini invaded, killing off the treaties anyway, and leaving the facts of Ethiopian administration on the ground. Thus, for the Western Sector, Meles' sin of omission (Evidence #4) which was actually a cover for the crime of 1991, is now being served as a “peaceful gesture” on Meles' part through this unilateral recognition of the Temporary Security Zone as a de facto boundary. The same argument can be applied to the Eastern Sector as well. The Temporary Security Zone's boundary along this sector is on a line roughly 70 km parallel inland from the Red Sea. Again, this line is formed by what Meles agreed is Ethiopia's “border” before 1991. The whole question of Ethopia's legal and moral claim on this coastline has been covered before, so this Evidence #9, is just a further giving away of what is Ethiopia's but over which the international community has to finally and legally agree anyway. SUMMARY: These points then sum up to the following picture:
Issayas's grand design can be deemed as the following.
From Issayas' point of view, this appears to be a confirmation that what he really, really wants is NOT closure on the “border” issue, but the destruction of Meles, which he probably believes will be naturally followed by a power vacuum into which he can step in to fulfill his dream of being the power broker in the horn. CONCLUSION: Notice that the preceding paragraphs did not speak about anything from Ethiopia's point of view. What is evident from this is that even today, the people and interests of Ethiopia are not factors in this tango to the death between Meles and Issayas. Meles is still engaged in the selling out of Ethiopian land, security, people and interest. Issayas is still engaged in the politics of being the powerbroker of the horn. The Ethiopian people have only backstabbers to represent them in the world stage. And hence, the more things change, the more they stay the same. |