Justice in Ethiopia
www.justiceinethiopia.net
The More Things Change, The More They Stay The Same
By Dereje, September 27, 2003


Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi recently sent the United Nations Security Council and the Secretary General a letter dated September 19, 2003, in which he asks for a new resolution mechanism for resolving the “unresolved” areas of the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

While on the face of it this letter seems to imply a different direction, and even a change of heart on behalf of the Prime Minister on an issue that has much existential bearing and emotional weight to the vast majority of Ethiopians, closer examination in fact reveals this letter to be nothing more than a plea to Issayas Afeworki and the UN Security Council for flexibility and help in the project of selling out Ethiopian land, people and interest out of which Meles has made a career.

1. Meles starts off, in the first paragraph, by saying that,

    "...The key to the crisis of the work of the Commission is its totally illegal, unjust and irresponsible decisions on Badme and parts of the Central sector. The Colonial treaties, which are the basis of the Algiers Agreement and which should have been the key basis for the delimitation and demarcation of the boundary..."
This very phrase, an indictment of the Border Commission for not being true to the “Colonial Treaties”, sustains the defunct colonial treaty basis of the Algiers agreement, when in fact the Ethiopian people's interest lies in the fundamental rejection of the colonial treaties as the bases for the drawing of Ethiopia's borders. The fact that these treaties are in legal terms null and void, and have been made so through the actions of one of the signatories, namely Italy, has been conclusively established by legal scholars. Meles is faulting the commission for NOT sticking to these very same colonial treaties. Let us call this Evidence #1.

2. His protestations on "Badme" are just on the "village of Badme", and not on the vast agriculturally rich plains south of the Mereb (remember the term "Mereb-Millash" as we will come on it in a little bit) and in Western Shire which have always been administered through Tigray. Remember that in the letter, he says of the village of Badme,

    "...the Commission chose to base its decision on State practice, and having done so, it went on and awarded Badme to Eritrea despite the overwhelming evidence produced by Ethiopia proving that Badme had always been administered by Ethiopia..."
Yet, he says nothing of the same administrative history in the plains west of the town of Badme, about which we now know much much documentary and witness evidence can be gathered and given. Hold on to this sin of ommission, because he is going to follow it up with a sin of commission. Call this Evidence #2.

3. Meles then says,

    "...The Boundary Commission admits that there are indeed anomalies in its decision but states that it is unable to correct them unless the parties give it an additional mandate. The commission cannot be unaware of Eritrea's total rejection of dialogue on demarcation. Nothing worthwhile can therefore be expected from the Commission to salvage the peace process..."
What does this mean? It means that Meles has begged Issayas to see if they can work out what the Boundary Commission without a sense of irony calls “…anomalies…” and over which Meles is now at the end of his political life. And the result of the begging? Nothing! Let us call this Evidence #3.

Next, after a few diplomatic niceties, we come to a six point proposal on "resolving" the impasse. I will spare you the rest of the details, and come straight to points number 1, 4 and 5, which are the heart of the matter.

4. Ever the peaceful one, Meles says in Point #1 of his letter,

    "...Ethiopia, while reaffirming its commitment under the Algiers agreement, stands ready to enter into a formal agreement to reject the use of force as a means of resolving disputes..."

Let us call this Evidence #4. Why is this important? We will see a little bit later.

5. He then starts off point #4 by saying,

    "...The uncontested part of the Boundary, specifically the whole Eastern Sector..."
The whole Eastern sector is Ethiopia's Afar coast, and he, once again, chooses to hand it over "uncontested". Yet another sin of omission. Call this Evidence #5.

6. The same first sentence of the fourth point of this document, continues in describing the other "uncontested" area, namely:

    "... that part of the Central Sector where the River Mereb constitutes the boundary..."
This "uncontested" area lies between the town of Badme, and the Tsorona area. Both, by the way, lies just south of the Mereb river. This phrase is interesting in the following ways;
    6a) It omits the Western Sector from the "Contested" list, thereby in effect saying that it is NOT contested and thus Eritrea's by default. This is another sin of ommission that compounds the sin of ommission stated in #2 above. Call this Evidence #6.

    6b) It is also interesting that he falls back on the "Mereb" river as a natural boundary. Please see my statement above about the phrase "Mereb Millash", which Ethiopians and Eritreans know as the historic boundary between Eritrea and the rest of Ethiopia. When it is convenient for Melles he remembers this historical reality, and thus cannot fail to use it as a reasonable basis for arguments. Call this Evidence #7.

7. This very same sentence continues by saying:
    "...The uncontested parts….can be demarcated without waiting for the setting up of the alternative mechanism..."
Call this Evidence #8.

8. Point number 5 of Meles' letter then completes these instances of sins of omission, (i.e. Evidence #2, Evidence #5 and Evidence #6), and completes them by a sin of commission, when he says:

    "...In the meantime, Ethiopia will recognize the current status quo, which is the southern boundary of the Temporary Security Zone, as the boundary between the two countries..."
Let us call this Evidence #9.

The southern boundary of the Temporary Security Zone is formed on the basis of what Meles understood to be the Colonial Treaty lines, and NOT on what has historically been administered by Ethiopia. For the Western Sector, about which Meles now says nothing, this issue is important, in that the TPLF had already, even before 1991, given up Ethiopia's right on much of the land west of this line anyway, and hence that is why after the war, the Ethiopian army was pulled back, NOT to the historically Ethiopian administered line, but to the line that the TPLF had ALREADY given to Eritrea. In other words, the dead treaties established the “straight line” east of which was supposed to be administered by Ethiopia and west of which was supposed to be administered by Italy. But Italy NEVER administered on IT'S side of the line. Ethiopia however, (through Tigray) administered ALL the land south of the Mereb/Gash, and hence the “straight line” never was a line of actual administration. That is why the general understanding of the Mereb as the northern boundary of Tigray persists. So Ethiopia's administrative history, and the experience of the people who live there, is that the “natural boundary” is and has always been the Mereb/Gash river. Then in 1935, Mussolini invaded, killing off the treaties anyway, and leaving the facts of Ethiopian administration on the ground. Thus, for the Western Sector, Meles' sin of omission (Evidence #4) which was actually a cover for the crime of 1991, is now being served as a “peaceful gesture” on Meles' part through this unilateral recognition of the Temporary Security Zone as a de facto boundary.

The same argument can be applied to the Eastern Sector as well. The Temporary Security Zone's boundary along this sector is on a line roughly 70 km parallel inland from the Red Sea. Again, this line is formed by what Meles agreed is Ethiopia's “border” before 1991. The whole question of Ethopia's legal and moral claim on this coastline has been covered before, so this Evidence #9, is just a further giving away of what is Ethiopia's but over which the international community has to finally and legally agree anyway.

SUMMARY:

These points then sum up to the following picture:

  • Meles tells Issayas that he has been true to his word, i.e. he has retained the basis of Ethiopia's borders to be the Colonial Treaties (Evidence #1), and has made sure that his army sticks to Issayas and Meles's interpretation of these treaties, namely what is now the Temporary Security Zone. (Evidence #9)
  • Meles tells Issayas that he has given him all the vast lands of the Western Sector. (Evidences #2, 6, 9)
  • Meles tells Issayas that he has given him the Afar coastline. (Evidences #5, 9)
  • Meles tells Issayas that he won't contest these (Evidences #5, 6), that they can be demarcated quickly (Evidence #8), and that he promises not to fight him on these (Evidence #4).
  • Meles tells Issayas that all he wants is the “village” of Badme (Evidence #2) and some parts of the Central Sector, i.e. the Irob area, (Evidence #6, 7).
  • Meles tells Issayas, I have given you all these, why won't you talk to me? (Evidence #3)
The picture that emerges is that of Meles begging Issayas to let him live as he has fulfilled almost everything he has promised him. From Meles' point of view, his request to Issayas is reasonable.

Issayas's grand design can be deemed as the following.

    a) Gaining a strategic lock on Ethiopian security and economy by rendering Ethiopia landlocked.
    b) Facilitate the complete Tigreanization / Christianization of Eritrea by the resettlement of the crowded Tigrinya speaking highland Christians into the vast and fertile lowlands that are now the Kunama and Shire areas, in the process dispossessing the Kunama and anyone else who lives there.
Thus from Meles' point of view, he has delivered on both of these strategic goals. Issayas gets little value from the “village” of Badme. And Issayas will only gain the “troublesome” Irob, who live in relatively densely populated and very mountainous areas anyway. So Meles is in fact sparing Issayas the trouble.

From Issayas' point of view, this appears to be a confirmation that what he really, really wants is NOT closure on the “border” issue, but the destruction of Meles, which he probably believes will be naturally followed by a power vacuum into which he can step in to fulfill his dream of being the power broker in the horn.

CONCLUSION:

Notice that the preceding paragraphs did not speak about anything from Ethiopia's point of view. What is evident from this is that even today, the people and interests of Ethiopia are not factors in this tango to the death between Meles and Issayas.

Meles is still engaged in the selling out of Ethiopian land, security, people and interest. Issayas is still engaged in the politics of being the powerbroker of the horn. The Ethiopian people have only backstabbers to represent them in the world stage.

And hence, the more things change, the more they stay the same.